as some of the criteria for use of 'legal system ', and if, on a particular occasion, A were to say " There is a legal system in Bodia ", would not A be thereby implicitly acknowledging that what he has referred to as the legal system of Bodia is what it ought to be at least in the sense that it is to some extent serving its purpose, i.e. the control of human behaviour ? And would not this show that Bodia's legal system, " as it is ", is in this respect indistinguishable from " what it ought to be " ?2 A's assertion that Bodia has a legal system does imply that what he has called the legal system of Bodia is what it ought to be at least in the sense that it is to some extent serving its purpose, i.e. controlling human behaviour. But this is only to take note of a tautology, for to say that a system of rules for controlling behaviour exists is to say, in part, that this system is functioning to some extent as it ought to function if it is to serve its purpose, i.e. social control.3 Moreover, it still remains possible to separate what, for lack of a more concise expression, might be called " is " and " ought " components of the " is " judgment that there is a legal system in Bodia. Thus, we may distinguish between: (1) the judgment that in Bodia there is a body of rules functioning in various ways, and (2) the judgment that in view of the purposes for which these rules exist, they are functioning as they ought to function. It may be, however, that we cannot readily specify precisely when we should say: " This system of rules is functioning so ineffectively that it should not be called a legal system"5 instead of, simply, " This legal system is not functioning effectively ". The difficulty here is common to the application of many general concepts. When is a stove simply not a stove rather than a malfunctioning one ? This difficulty should not, however, be thought of as standing in the way of a clear distinction between 'is ' and 'ought ' in particular cases.4 Uncertainty with respect to where a line is to be drawn should not be confused with unclarity of that line as drawn. Moreover, in other contexts we do not hesitate to apply or withhold general terms because we are not certain precisely where the line should be drawn: we sometimes call men " tall " without being sure just how many inches constitute tallness, and we call men " bald " without being sure just how few hairs one must have to be bald. Why should we vary our practice where the term is 'law ' ?
Suppose it is said that a legal system cannot exist unless the " constitutional"5 rules for identifying the rules of the legal system are accepted by the vast majority of the citizenry. Assume further, that it is urged (1) that such acceptance can be forthcoming only if the constitutional rules are morally as they ought to be, and (2) that from this it follows that when A says " There is a legal system in Bodia ", A implicitly acknowledges that some part ( 4Fuller has argued that it does. Supra, n. 2. system of Bodia is as it ought to be.5 Again, this would not establish the indistinguishability of the existing legal system of Bodia from what it ought to be. First, I should point out that it is simply not true that public acceptance of the rules for identifying the rules of the system can be forthcoming only if those rules are somehow morally what they ought to be. Acceptance of such rules may be based on other factors such as fear of force, " calculations of long-term interest; disinterested interest in others; an unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude; or the mere wish to do as others do ".6 But secondly, even if it be conceded that such acceptance could only be based on the fact that such rules are morally what they ought to be, this would only mean that the " moral oughtness " of these rules is part of the definition of 'legal system' so that it becomes tautologous to say: " There is a legal system in Bodia having rules for identifying its rules that are morally as they ought to be ". Moreover, it would still be possible to separate " is " from " ought " (in this limited sense of 'ought') conditions for use of the phrase 'There is a legal system in X '. Among the " is " conditions would be the existence of a system of rules of control and the fact of public acceptance of rules for identifying the rules of this system; among the " ought " conditions would be the judgment that such rules are morally what they ought to be. Even if one or more of the foregoing arguments did establish some way or ways in which the legal system " as it is " could not be distinguished from the legal system " as it ought to be ", it would still be open to me to distinguish between the law as it is and the law as it ought to be in other obvious ways. For example, I might say that although there is a system of law in Bodia, this system is not administered as it ought to be: the rules are unfairly or inconsistently applied. " Y is a legal rule." When this phrase is ordinarily used, and used correctly, at least the following conditions are normally present: (1) a legal system is in operation, and (2) the rule referred to complies with authoritative criteria (or rules) for identifying the rules of the system. Now, if A says : " Y is a legal rule ", does not A implicitly acknowledge that Y is a functioning rule ? And does not this show that Y, as a functioning rule, cannot be distinguished from what it ought to be, i.e. a functioning legal rule ? No. Accepted criteria for identifying legal rules in modern legal systems do not (though they could) include a requirement that the rule be functioning or enforced. In fact, the officials of a moderni legal system might not be enforcing Y at all, or the citizenry might be disregarding it, but this would not make Y any the less a rule of law. True, A's statement ' Y is a legal rule' does implicitly commit A to the view that rule Y conforms to criteria to which it must conform if it is to be a legal rule. But this only shows that to say that Y is a legal rule is to say that Y is a rule that Assume that Y is a rule of case law: a court has just decided a novel case and applied Y in so doing. Assume also that the court's decision was based on an insufficient understanding of the facts, and that informed lawyers believe that when the case is re-argued on rehearing, the court, being a good court, will probably change its mind. With respect to the facts of the case, what is the law as of the time before the rehearing ? (Lawyers must often say what the law is in advance of an authoritative pronouncement.) If A says the law is not rule Y, but rule Z, the rule that the court is likely to apply on rehearing, and if A says that the court is likely to apply rule Z because, in view of the facts, Z is the only rule that ought to be applied, has A conceded that 'is ' and ' ought' are here indistinguishable since the rule that is law, in A's judgment, is the rule that ought to be law ? No, again A is using the distinction rather than refusing to recognize it or blurring it. It is also a well-known fact that 
